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  Credit Constraints and Impact on Farm Household Welfare: 
Evidence from Vietnam’s North Central Coast region 
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Abstract: This study aims at identifying factors affecting formal credit constraint 
status of rural farm households in Vietnam’s North Central Coast region (NCC). 
Using the Direct Elicitation method (DEM), we consider both internal and external 
credit rationing. Empirical evidences confirm the importance of household head’s 
age, gender and education to household’s likelihood of being credit constrained. In 
addition, households who have advantages in farm land size, labour resources and 
non-farm income are less likely to be credit constrained. Poor households are 
observed to remain restricted by formal credit institutions. Results from the 
Endogenous Switching Regression model suggest that credit constraints have 
negative impact on household’s consumption per capita and informal credit can act 
as a substitute to mitigate the negative influence of formal credit constraints.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
At the end of 2011, approximately 68% of Vietnam population lives in the rural area 
(GSO, 2012b), with 67.83% of the households lives on the farm. The poverty rate in 
the rural area is much higher than the urban area (14% compared to 3% (GSO, 
2012b)). As savings in rural Vietnam is low (average 6.7 million Vietnam dong1 
(VND) per household annually (GSO, 2012a)), credit is considered to be an essential 
resource to improve farm household welfare and production. However, similar to 
many developing countries, Vietnam rural farm households are usually excluded by 
formal financial institutions due to high transaction cost and asymmetry information 
(Hoff & Stiglitz, 1990; Jaffee & Stiglitz, 1989). In addition, lack of collateral, weak 
credit contract enforcement and underdevelopment of insurance service discourage 
formal financers to serve this market segment (Ghosh, Mookherjee, & Ray, 2000). In 
order to meet credit demand of rural households at affordable interest rate, the 
government subsidizes formal credit supply through three organizations namely the 
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 Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD), Vietnam Bank for 
Social Policies (VBSP) and People’s Credit Funds (PCF). In spite of the 
government’s effort to expand subsidized credit institutions rapidly in recent years 
with the aim to combat poverty, many farm households remain constrained from 
formal credit and are forced to borrow from informal lenders (Barslund & Tarp, 
2008; Dufhues & Buchenrieder, 2005; Nguyen, 2008; Pham & Izumida, 2002).  
Despite the importance of formal credit to farm household outcomes in Vietnam, 
there are limited studies focusing on determinants of credit constraints and their 
impacts. To the best of our knowledge, there is no study evaluating the impact of 
credit constraints on rural farm household welfare particularly in Vietnam. In 
addition, the studies related to credit constraints only considered full quantity 
rationing (households applied for the loan and then were rejected), omitting the case 
of partly quantity rationing (loan obtained by the borrowers is less than their 
demand) and self-rationing.  
This paper aims to identify the factors determining credit constraints in rural North 
Central Coast region of Vietnam (NCC). The study also examines the impact of 
credit constraints on farm household welfare in the studied region. The remaining of 
the paper is organized as followed: Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3 
describes the data obtained from the household survey conducted in NCC region. 
Econometric models and empirical results are presented in Section 4. Conclusion and 
policy implications are discussed in Section 5. The last Section highlights the 
limitations of the study.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Factors affecting credit constraints  
Studies on determinants of credit constraints focus on three groups of factors namely 
characteristics of household head, household characteristics and geography related 
factors. 
2.1.1. Characteristics household head 
The most frequent household head related variables used to explain household’s 
credit constraint status are age, gender and education. Empirically, previous studies 
show mixed results of the impact of age and gender on likelihood to be credit 
constrained. Freeman, Ehui, and Jabbar (1998) and Jia et al.(2010) find a negative 
relationship between age and probability of being credit constrained which is 
consistent with Barslund and Tarp (2008) in the case of Vietnam; Baiyegunhi et al. 
(2010) and Chaudhuri et al.(2011), show the inverse result. Similarly, the expected 
effect of gender on credit constraints is theoretically ambiguous. On one hand, male-
headed households seem to have higher demand for credit (Mpuga, 2010) since they 
have better access to production resources, but they are disadvantaged to approach 
subsidized credit which is often in favour of women, therefore, they are more credit 
constrained. On the other hand, they are more self-financed than their female 
counterparts (Franklin, Diagne, & Zeller, 2008). Nevertheless, empirical studies 
show that male is more likely to be credit constrained (Barslund & Tarp, 2008; 
Chaudhuri & Cherical, 2011; Freeman et al., 1998; Zeller, 1994).  
 Education of household head is expected to improve the accessibility to formal credit 
since more educated farmers are believed to allocate credit more efficiently 
(Barslund & Tarp, 2008; Jia et al., 2010; Pham & Izumida, 2002). Surprisingly, 
households studied by Zeller (1994) are more credit constrained when they have 
more years of formal education. It may be due to the fact that the purpose of 
subsidized loan is for disadvantaged and illiterate households (Franklin et al., 2008) 
2.1.2. Characteristics of households 
Characteristics of households influencing household’s constraint status can be 
categorized in four groups: physical capital related factors, human capital related 
factors, social capital related factors and economic related factors.  
Physical capital can reduce the probability of being credit constrained since it can be 
used as collateral to minimize repayment default and evidence of household 
production capacity. Land title, land area, value of house, asset and livestock are 
popular indicators for physical capital. In general, households having land title are 
less likely to be credit constrained (Baiyegunhi et al., 2010; Boucher, Guirkinger, & 
Trivelli, 2009; Foltz, 2004), but the effect of land area is ambiguous. In some 
countries, farm land cannot be used as a collateral for example in China (Jia et al., 
2010), thus, land area may have positive, negative, or no effect on credit constraints, 
depending on its effect on demand for credit. Foltz (2004) argues that land title can 
loosen credit restriction, but land area has insignificant effect. In China, Peru and 
Malawi, more farm land area means higher propensity to be credit rationed (Boucher 
et al., 2009; Jia et al., 2010) which is also reported in Petrick’s (2004a) study on the 
effect of rented land. On the contrary, Reyes (2011) and Omonona et al.(2008) find 
the contributory effect of land area to ease credit rationing. Both land area and land 
use right (red book) in Vietnam have insignificant effects on the bank’s decision to 
provide credit (Barslund & Tarp, 2008; Pham & Izumida, 2002). 
Asset (including wealth) could be a proxy for household’s physical capital. It is 
expected that households possessing more valuable asset are less dependent on credit 
and have more capacity to repay debt, therefore, are more likely to be credit 
unconstrained (Baiyegunhi et al., 2010; Boucher et al., 2009). Depending on the 
studied area, indicators for asset include availability of durable assets (Fenwick & 
Lyne, 1998), age of collateral assets (Petrick, 2004a), value of durable or total asset 
(Baiyegunhi et al., 2010; Boucher et al., 2009; Chaudhuri & Cherical, 2011) or 
weighted average durable asset (Winter-Nelson & Temu, 2005). Pham et al. (2002) 
and Barslund (2008) find insignificant effect of total asset value on lending decision 
of financial institutions in Vietnam. This independent relationship can be explained 
by the weak enforcement of credit contract in Vietnam that makes physical collateral 
become an ineffective screening device. Some physical capital related indicators 
represent production capacity rather than collateral value such as herd size or farm 
size also significantly affect credit restriction (Freeman et al., 1998; Kuwornu, 
Ohene-Ntow, & Asuming-Brempong, 2012).   
Indicators for human capital include household size, dependency ratio, number of 
labours, number of males, and number of females. Families with higher number of 
persons are expected to have high consumption expenditures which decrease 
available capital to production and increase their dependence on credit; while the 
 effect of family size on supply side is vague. Therefore, households with larger 
family size are more inclined to be credit constrained (Chaudhuri & Cherical, 2011; 
Kuwornu et al., 2012).  Other studies pay attention on dependency ratio on which the 
hypothesized sign is unanticipated. Empirically, this variable can have a negative 
(Pham & Izumida, 2002) or positive effect (Freeman et al., 1998) on the accessibility 
to formal credit. Instead of using dependency ratio, some studies separately examine 
the effect of the number of dependents and adults or labours on credit constraints 
(Barslund & Tarp, 2008), while some separate the effect of male and female labours 
(Boucher et al., 2009; Petrick, 2004a; Simtowe, Diagne, & Zeller, 2008). It is 
reported that families with more adults are more likely to be credit constrained as 
they have higher demand for credit, but the effect of male and female labours are 
mixed. While households with more female labours experience a difficulty in 
attracting credit in Petrick’s (2004a), Simtowe et al.’s (2008) study concludes more 
male labours increase the likelihood of being credit constrained.   
In the areas where training programs are available to support farmers to enhance their 
farm production, participation of farmers in these programs become an important 
factor. Participants in these programs have a higher probability to obtain credit since 
they are expected to be more productive (Reyes, 2011). Surprisingly, Freeman et al. 
(1998) demonstrates opposite finding, but the unexpected result was not explained by 
the authors. 
Social capital plays a crucial role in determining the success of households to attain 
credit, especially when physical collateral becomes ineffective loan screening device. 
Social capital can be divided into three types: the social status of household in 
community, the relationship of household with financial institutions and social group 
participation. Reputation, social status or entitlement in community (Jia et al., 2010; 
Pham & Izumida, 2002) is hypothesized to increase households’ accessibility to 
formal credit. The good relationship with financial institutions measured by the 
length of relationship with banks (Reyes, 2011), connections with bank official 
(Barslund & Tarp, 2008) or savings account in banks (Gershon, Lau, Lin, & Luo, 
1990) repayment history (Barslund & Tarp, 2008; Chaudhuri & Cherical, 2011). 
Participation in social groups reduces the probability of being rejected by the 
financial institutions since it decreases transaction cost to screen the household’s 
creditworthiness (Reyes, 2011; Winter-Nelson & Temu, 2005). Dinh, Dufhues, and 
Buchenrieder (2012) use four indicators, such as strong and weak ties to persons of 
similar social standing (for example friends and family) and strong and weak ties to 
persons of higher social standing (for instance local authority) to measure 
household’s social capital in Vietnam. However, none of these indicators is found to 
have any effect on the likelihood that farm households are credit constrained. 
Economic indicators such as income and expenditure are found to have significant 
effects on credit constraints in previous studies (Foltz, 2004; Gershon et al., 1990; 
Kuwornu et al., 2012). Barslund and Tarp (2008) and Freeman et al. (1998) study the 
effect of production expenditure on credit constraints but only Barslund and Tarp’s 
(2008) study shows significant positive relationship between expenditure on 
livestock feed and credit constraints. A major concern with these studies is the 
endogenous problem as credit constraints are proven to have impact on income and 
expenditure (Baiyegunhi et al., 2010; Li & Zhi, 2010). Other studies pay attention to 
the ratio of debt to income which is reported to curtail the probability that households 
 can obtain formal credit (Baiyegunhi et al., 2010; Zeller, 1994).  
It is believed that the main sources of households’ income are correlated with their 
credit constraint status. Economic activities which are prioritized by government, 
more familiar to financial institutions and less risky increase the opportunity for 
households to obtain loan. Jia et al. (2010) and Chaudhuri and Cherical (2011) 
illustrate that households who are more dependent on farming is less likely to fall in 
the credit constraint category since farming is prioritized by the government. On the 
contrary, Stampini and Davis’s (2009) study shows that non-agricultural income 
reduces the dependence of farm households on credit, thus, relax credit constraints. 
The fluctuation of farm yields (Boucher et al., 2009), changes in agricultural product 
prices (Winter-Nelson & Temu, 2005), and engagement with atypical crops (Reyes, 
2011) can aggravate credit constraints.  
2.1.3. Geography related factors 
According to Boucher et al. (2009) and Winter-Nelson and Temu (2005), distance to 
market or formal lenders increases transaction cost on households, therefore, 
exacerbates credit constraints. In addition, Barslund and Tarp’s (2008) and Foltz’s 
(2004) studies show that credit constraints are also determined by activeness of local 
credit institutions and local production development. Barslund and Tarp’s (2008) 
study indicates that in Vietnam, in the areas where formal credit is more prevalent, 
households are less likely to be credit constrained. However, there is a concern that 
the result suffers from simultaneity as lower probability of being credit constrained 
attaches the households to formal credit.  
2.2. Impact of credit constraints on household outcomes 
Studies on the impact of credit constraints on household outcome predominantly 
focus on household productivity, investment and welfare. In term of household 
welfare, Dong, Lu, and Featherstone (2010), Li and Zhi (2010) and Kumar, Turvey, 
and Kropp (2013) indicate that credit constraints are detrimental to household 
income. Furthermore, credit constraints are attributed to decrease in household 
consumption. Credit constrained households suffer from a loss of 15.8% and 18.2% 
in consumption expenditure in  Li and Zhi’s (2010) and Li, Li, Huang, and Zhu’s 
(2013) studies, respectively. The results are consistent with Zeldes (1989), Phimister 
(1995), Baiyegunhi et al. (2010) and Kumar et al. (2013) findings. Although the 
importance of credit especially microfinance to Vietnam rural households has been 
confirmed by many studies (see Nghiem, Coelli, & Rao (2012); Nguyen, Bigman, 
Van den Berg, & Vu (2007); and Phan (2012)), to the best of our knowledge, there is 
no study examining the impact of credit constraints on household outcomes.   
3. DATA 
The survey at household level was conducted in three provinces out of six provinces 
in the North Central Coast region. The sample households were selected using multi-
staged stratified random sampling technique. In the first stage, three provinces 
namely Ha Tinh, Nghe An and Thua Thien Hue which are representatives of low, 
medium and high income per capita groups, respectively were chosen. In the next 
stage, two districts from Nghe An (Yen Thanh and Thanh Chuong) were selected 
 while only one district was selected from Thua Thien Hue (Huong Thuy) and Ha 
Tinh (Thach Ha) as we would like to compare the likelihood of being credit 
constrained among households in the same and different provinces. From the lists of 
communes2 provided by the District People Committees, a commune from each 
district was also randomly selected. However, communes where there is no 
agriculture activity were excluded from the random lists. In the final stage, the 
sample households were randomly selected from the list of households provided by 
Commune People Committee and only farm households were included in the list. A 
total of 550 households were interviewed, yielding 479 usable questionnaires. 
3.1. Credit constraints in the studied area  
Table 1: Reasons for Household’s formal credit constraint condition  
Description 
Credit application status 
 
Households who 
applied for 
formal credit 
Household 
who did not 
apply for 
formal credit 
Total 
Number of respondent households 310 (64.72%) 169 (35.38%) 479 (100%) 
Number of credit constrained households 142 (29.65 %) 52 (10.86 %) 194 (40.5%) 
Reason for formal credit constraints:    
 Constrained non-borrowers and reason  52 (10.86 %)  
     - Administrative difficulties to process loan  40 (8.35%)  
     - Fear of being rejected  12 (2.5%)  
 Rejected borrowers and reason  53 (11.06%)   
     - Rejected due to lack of collateral         37 (7.72%)   
     - Other reasons 16 (3.34%)   
 Non-rejected borrowers who received  
insufficient amount and reason  89 (18.58%) 
  
    - Lack of collateral  17 (3.55%)   
    - The amount requested exceeded limitation  
       set by the bank 
62 (12.94%) 
  
    - Reason other than those sited above  10 (2.09%)   
Source: Author’s calculations from the household survey 
To identify credit constrained and unconstrained households, we applied Direct 
Elicitation method suggested by Boucher et al. (2009). According to the household’s 
survey response, there are 310 households (64.72% of total surveyed households) 
applied for credit from formal source, in which 53 households were rejected by 
formal institutions. The main reason for rejection is lack of collateral (70%). Among 
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 the 257 households who successfully obtained the loan, the survey result shows 89 
households did not receive sufficient amount of loan mainly because of bank’s 
limitation (62 households) and lack of collateral (17 households). Further 169 
households who did not apply for formal credit, 52 households reported that they had 
demand for formal credit but they did not apply due to either administrative 
difficulties to process the loan (40 households) or fear of rejection (12 households) 
while the remaining households had no demand for formal credit. Based on the 
information provided by the households, 194 households are categorized to be credit 
constrained, accounting for 40.5% of total surveyed households, in which 40 
households are considered to be transaction cost constrained, the remaining are 
quantity constrained. No household is identified to be risk constrained. This may be 
due to the fact that in rural Vietnam, when the households fail to pay their debts on 
due date, banks prefer to restructure their loans rather than to foreclose the 
household’s property because their property has low liquidity.   
3.2. Descriptive statistics of surveyed households 
The characteristics of surveyed households are presented in Table 2 (Appendix). 
Majority of household heads are male accounting for 79%. It is common in rural 
Vietnam that males usually make important decisions since they are the main income 
earners and head of the household. Most of the respondents are married, belong to 
the age group of 35 to 55 years old and have middle school degree as the highest 
education attainment. The typical households consists of 5 members with 3 children. 
Although all respondents are engaged in at least one farming activity, only 60% of 
respondents consider it as the main occupation. The average size of household’s farm 
land is 0.36 ha and their annual income reaches 58.68 million VND. Mean of 
household consumption per capita is 10.6 million VND. 20% of respondents are 
certified as the poor.   
4. METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Model for identifying determinants of credit constraints  
Since the dependent variable in the model for identifying determinants of credit 
constraints is binary, either logit or probit model model is preferred to linear 
probability because the latter model cannot assure the probability value is in the 
range between 0 and 1 (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2011). The difference between logit 
and probit model is the assumption of random term distribution. The error term in 
logit model is assumed to have cumulative distribution while normally distributed in 
probit model (Greene, 2003).  In this study, we choose logit model because of its 
simplicity and the availability of odds ratios which is not the case with probit model. 
Since our survey covers both credit constrained borrowers and credit constrained 
non-borrowers, selectivity bias is not a major concern,  thus  we do not need to apply 
two stage procedure suggested by Heckman (1979). According to Wooldridge 
(2002), the use of two stage procedure in this case results in large standard errors. 
The credit constraint condition of the borrower 𝑖 is defined by: 
𝐶𝐶 = 1   𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝐶 = 𝛼𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 > 0                                              (1) 
𝐶𝐶 = 0   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                      
 𝐶𝐶 is credit constraint status of a household which is equal to 1 if household is credit 
constrained, zero  otherwise;  Z  is a vector of household head, household and 
geography characteristics;   is error term;  is parameter to be estimated. The 
probability a household is credit constrained or 1CC   can be written as: 
 ( )
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And the probability that household is credit unconstrained or 0CC   is: 
1
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1 exp( )i
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  

                                        (3) 
4.2. Model for measuring the impact of credit constraints on household welfare 
With regards to the impact of credit constraints measurement on household welfare, 
endogenous switching regression model (ESRM) is applied to address the possible 
selection bias issue. The choice of ESRM is supported by Kiefer (1978), Poirier and 
Ruud (1981), Maddala (1983a) and Mare and Winship (1987). The model is also 
used in previous studies to evaluate the impact of credit constraints (Baiyegunhi et 
al., 2010; Dong et al., 2010; Foltz, 2004; Freeman et al., 1998). 
According to Maddala (1983b), the usual exclusion restrictions or instrumental 
variables are not required in ESRM when there are enough observations in selection 
equation, but there should be at least one exogenous variable excluded from the 
outcome equations so that the parameters of outcome equations can be identified. 
However, Hamilton and Nickerson (2003) suggest the use of instrumental variables 
since in the absence of such instrumental variables the model still suffers from bias 
caused by unobserved factors. The problem is how we can evaluate the 
appropriateness of instrumental variable when there is lack of available tests for the 
validity of instrumental variables specified for ESRM. In García Pérez and Rebollo 
Sanz (2005) and Neal (1995) studies, the authors only can test the strength of 
instrumental variables by Likelihood ratio test. Further García Pérez and Rebollo 
Sanz (2005) admit the lack of over-identification test. To the best of our knowledge, 
there is no study conducting the test for the exogeneity of instrumental variables 
particularly for two step switching models.  
The ESRM can be expressed as follow (Maddala, 1983a):  
𝑌1𝑖 = 𝛿1𝑋1𝑖 + 𝜀1𝑖   iff    𝐶𝐶 = 1                            (4-1) 
𝑌0𝑖 = 𝛿0𝑋0𝑖 + 𝜀0𝑖   iff    𝐶𝐶 = 0             (4-2) 
Where 1iY  and 0iY represent welfare function of credit constrained and unconstrained 
households respectively; 1  and 0  are vectors of parameters; 𝜀1𝑖 and 𝜀0𝑖 are error 
terms. In the case of selection bias, the expected value of the error terms 𝜀1𝑖 and 𝜀0𝑖 
are different from zero, leading to inconsistent estimates from the OLS estimation. 
As suggested by Lee (1978), a two stage methods is used where expected values of 
the error terms 𝜀1𝑖 and 𝜀0𝑖 are: 
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Where  ,  are the probability density function and the cumulative distribution 
function of the standard normal, respectively. 𝛼𝑍𝑖̂  is fitted value of 𝐶𝐶 calculated by 
estimating equation (1). The ratio 𝜙/Φ in equation (5) and (6) is inverse Mills ratio 
terms, which can be written as: 
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Substituting equation (7) into equation (4-1) and (4-2) yields: 
𝑌1𝑖 = 𝛿1𝑋1𝑖 − 𝜎1𝜀𝜆1𝑖 +  𝜐1𝑖   iff    𝐶𝐶 = 1                                                         (8-1)  
𝑌0𝑖 = 𝛿0𝑋0𝑖 + 𝜎0𝜀𝜆0𝑖 +  𝜐0𝑖   iff    𝐶𝐶 = 0                             (8-2) 
Where 𝜐1𝑖 and 𝜐0𝑖 are new error terms with zero expected value. Equation (8-1) and 
(8-2) are estimated by weighted least squares as 𝜐1𝑖 and 𝜐0𝑖 are heteroscedastic.  
4.3. Empirical results 
4.3.1. Determinants of credit constraints 
Table 2 describes the explanatory variables used in the logit model. The VIF test 
(mean VIF=1.48) confirms the absence of multicollinearity from the model. High p 
value (p=0.81) obtained from Hosmer-Lemeshow’s goodness of fit test indicates the 
model is well-fitted with the data (Janosz, LeBlanc, Boulerice, & Tremblay, 1997). 
The percentage of observations that are correctly predicted by the model is 77.36% 
(PCP =76.36). The likelihood ratio test (LR test) with   𝜒2(12)=215.45 indicates that 
the model as a whole is significant at 1% level. Marginal effects were estimated only 
for continuous variables since they may not be meaningful for discrete variables 
(Greene, 2003). 
Table 3 shows the significant effect of gender, age, education, demanded size of 
loan, size of farm land, labour ratio, off-farm labour, poor certificate and one 
geography dummy variable on the  household’s likelihood of being credit 
constrained.  
All three characteristics of household head have significant effect on household 
credit constraint condition. The significantly negative effect of age on household’s 
credit constraint status indicates that household heads who are older than 55 have 
lower propensity of being credit constrained. It may be due to the fact that older 
farmers often accumulate enough capital and they are less likely to invest. The result 
is supported by findings of Barslund and Tarp (2008). Our result also indicates that 
female household head are more likely to be credit constrained than their male 
counterparts. The odds ratio of 0.46 implies that the odds that female-headed 
households are credit constrained is 2.17 times (1/0.46) higher than their male 
 counterparts. Similarly, the odds that household heads who obtained high school 
degree or higher are credit constrained is 1.82 times lower than those who only 
obtain secondary or primary school.  
The influence of human capital on the likelihood of being credit constrained is 
confirmed by the significant effect of labour ratio and number of off-farm labours on 
household’s credit constraint condition. The result is consistent with Petrick’s 
(2004b) study, which indicates that households having income earner advantages are 
more likely to receive sufficient loans.  
Table 3: Logit model for credit constraint determinants  
Variable Coefficient T-ratio 
Odd 
Ratios 
Marginal 
effect 
GENDER -0.775 2.56* 0.46  
AGE_55PLUS -1.160   3.04** 0.31  
HIGH_EDU -0.590 1.99* 0.55  
DEMANDDUM 2.316    8.47** 10.13  
LANDSIZE -0.072  2.27* 0.93 -0.016 
INRATIO -0.207  2.18* 0.81 -0.046 
LARATIO -1.886    2.59** 0.15 -0.426 
OFFFARM -0.627    3.03** 0.53 -0.141 
POOR 0.753  2.30* 2.12  
VANTHANH 0.444       1.29 1.55  
THACHTIEN 0.231       0.60 1.26  
THUYTHANH 0.888       2.17* 2.43  
Constant 1.599       2.54* 4.95  
Number of observation    477 
Likelihood ratio               215.45** 
Pseudo R2                        0.3347    
PCP                                  77.36 
EPCP                                70.60 
Note: ** and* denotes significance at 1% and 5% level respectively; PCP is an 
abbreviation for percentage correctly predicted; EPCP is an abbreviation for 
expected percent correctly predicted. 
The effect of farm land area is found to be negative and significant at 5% level, 
indicating that households possessing larger farm land size have more advantages to 
approach formal credit. It is important to emphasize that in the case of Vietnam, farm 
land is an indicator for production capacity rather than being treated as collateral.   
The negative relationship between ratio of non-farm income to farm income and the 
propensity to be credit constrained implies that the more the family depends on farm 
income, the more likely they are credit constrained. This finding supports Stampini 
and Davis’s (2009) results uncovering that non-agricultural income reduces the 
dependence of households on credit, thus, relax credit constraints in rural Vietnam. 
In term of geography variables, our survey covers four areas THANHCHUONG and 
YENTHANH (belongs to Nghe An), THACHHA (Ha Tinh) and HUONGTHUY 
(Thua Thien Hue).  As THANHCHUONG has a higher poverty rate than 
HUONGTHUY, but lower poverty rate than THACHHA, and the same provincial 
location with YENTHANH, it is used as the reference geography dummy variable in 
 the logit model. The results in Table 3 show that only HUONGTHUY is significantly 
different from the reference location. This means the households living in low 
poverty rate communes find it more difficult to access to formal credit since 
disadvantaged areas are often prioritized by subsidized institutions.  
Although the poor is considered the target group of subsidized credit, they are more 
likely to be credit constrained than non-poor households. The odds ratio of 2.12 
indicates that the odds that poor households are rationed is 2.12 times higher than 
their non-poor counterparts. This supports the findings of Nguyen (2008) who 
postulates that poor households are more likely to be excluded by formal financial 
institutions.  
We add the demand dummy variable which is equal to 1 if households need to 
borrow more than 30 million VND and 0 otherwise with the aim to test whether the 
limitation of loan size at 30 million VND set by the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies 
can meet the farm household’s demand for credit. The significantly negative 
relationship between this variable and credit constraint status (at 1% level) reveals 
that subsidized credit only satisfy partially farm household’s demand for credit. In 
addition, if the household’s demand exceeds 30 million VND their odds of being 
credit constrained is 10.13 times higher than those whose demand is lower than 30 
million VND (see Table 3). 
The marginal effects presented in Table 3 uncover that among the factors affecting 
household’s credit constraint condition, human resources may be the most important 
determinants since labour ratio and number of off-farm labours have strongest 
marginal effects on probability of being credit constrained while the marginal effects 
of farm land size and income ratio are modest.   
4.3.2. The impact of credit constraints on household welfare   
Table 4 shows the results obtained from the endogenous switching regression model 
(Equation 8-1 and 8-2). Consumption per capita is chosen to be the indicator for 
household’s welfare. The choice of this proxy follows the recommendation of 
Ravallion (1992) and Coudouel, Hentschel, and Wodon (2002). Consumption per 
capita is measured in logarithm which fits the data better in the consumption function 
(Campbell & Deaton, 1989). Wald test confirms the significance of all regressors 
except the constant. The likelihood ratio test (LR test) with   𝜒2(2) = 5.04 which is 
significant at 10% level indicates that the endogenous switching model is better than 
the exogenous model. Furthermore, the significance of 𝜌1 implies that the sample 
may suffer from selection bias and OLS estimation would results in biased estimates. 
Since 𝜌1 is negative and significant at 1% level, we can conclude that credit 
constrained households have lower consumption per capita than a random household. 
The positive sign of 𝜌0 suggests that credit unconstrained household have higher 
consumption per capita than a random household, however the coefficient is 
insignificant and thus inconclusive. 
The predictors of consumption per capita are generally the same in the case of credit 
unconstrained and constrained households in terms of significance and sign except 
for the variable INFORMAL appearing only in the consumption equation (8-1) of 
credit constrained households. The negative significant effect of this variable on 
consumption per capita implies that credit constrained households who received 
sufficient amount of credit from informal sources can improve their consumption per 
capita by 8.4% (Table 4).  
 Table 4: Impact of credit constraints on household’s consumption per capita  
Variable name 
Credit unconstrained    Credit constrained 
Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
POOR -0.134   3.84***  -0.174 6.16*** 
LANDSIZE 0.016   4.20***  0.019 2.60*** 
HH_SIZE -0.104      10.21***  -0.133 10.99*** 
LARATIO 0.289    4.59***  0.271  3.03*** 
INRATIO 0.011    2.38 **  0.020     1.32 
GENDER -0.025       0.76  0.043     1.59 
AGE_55PLUS -0.011       0.47  -0.030     0.70 
HIGH_EDU 0.031       1.38  0.018     0.60 
CHILDSTU 0.132     6.12***  0.245 8.96*** 
OFFFARM 0.088   5.48***  0.125 5.28*** 
YENTHANH 0.079       2.52 **  -0.015     0.42 
THACHHA 0.063   2.18**  0.070     1.65 
HUONGTHUY 0.066   2.43**  -0.024     0.60 
INFORMAL    -0.084  3.63*** 
Constant 2.415       28.47***  2.508  27.01*** 
𝜎0𝜀    0.150      (23.44)***    
𝜎1𝜀   0.158      (12.85)***    
𝜌0   0.0892    (0.315)    
𝜌1   -0.617     (3.53)***    
Log likelihood    24.58    
Wald test   441.84***    
LR test   𝜒2(2) =5.04*      
Note:; ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively; 
figures in parenthesis are t-ratios; 𝜎0𝜀 and 𝜎1𝜀 are the square root of the variances 
of the residuals of consumption per capita models; 𝜌0 and 𝜌1 are correlation 
between error terms of credit constraint condition equation and equations of 
consumption per capita of credit unconstrained households and constrained 
households, respectively.  
Table 4 also shows the difference in the significance of income ratio variable and 
geography variables between the consumption equations of credit constrained and 
unconstrained households. The insignificant effect of income ratio variable on 
consumption per capita of credit constrained households implies that for constrained 
families, the role of non-farm income in improving household welfare is negligible. 
This could be due to the lack of credit and income generated from non-farm activities 
become instable, thus, leading to the minor change in consumption. Regarding 
geography variables, the significance of three dummy variables in credit 
unconstrained household’s consumption model reflects the deviation in living 
standard between THANHCHUONG and the three remaining locations.  However, 
there is no difference among consumption per capita of credit constrained households 
of THANHCHUONG and other locations. The lack of credit may be the reason that 
prevents households from utilising location advantages.  
 Noticeably, an addition member in credit constrained households reduces 
consumption per capita by 13.3% while in the case of credit unconstrained 
households is only 10.4%. Children’s tertiary expenditure is also a bigger burden for 
credit constrained households than credit non-constrained households. The presence 
of children studying at tertiary level increases the consumption per capita of credit 
constrained households by 24.5%, but only 13.2% in the case of credit unconstrained 
households (see Table 4).  
Consumption per capita of poor households is lower than their non-poor counterparts 
in the credit constrained group by 17.4% while the difference in consumption per 
capita between poor and non-poor households in credit unconstrained group is only 
13.4% (see Table 4). In other words, sufficient credit contributes to narrow the 
welfare gaps between the poor and non-poor households.  
5. CONCLUSION 
Using the Direct Elicitation method, our survey uncovers more than 40% of rural 
farm households in the Vietnam’s North Central Coast region are credit constrained 
by formal credit institutions. Quantity constraint accounts for the highest proportion 
of the cases, followed by transaction cost constraint. No case of risk constraint was 
reported. The empirical evidences reveal that young and less educated households 
with female head are less likely to receive sufficient loan from formal financial 
institutions. Similarly, farm land size, labour resources and non-farm income play an 
important role to relax household’s credit constraint status. The findings also raise 
the concern that subsidized credit allocation favours better off households but farm 
households in wealthier areas have disadvantages to obtain subsidized credit.  The 
maximum loan size offered by the formal financial institutions is still lower than the 
household’s actual demand. Moreover, our results clearly showed that credit 
constraints have negative impact on the household welfare in the North Central Coast 
region and this impact can be alleviated by informal credit.  
Our results recommend that apart from enhancing credit allocation regime, the 
government should focus on improving the households’ education and developing 
non-farm economic activities in rural areas which not only ease formal credit 
restriction but also promote household welfare. It is also important that policy 
makers and formal financial institutions pay more attention on finding relevant credit 
policy for the poor and disadvantaged households in lower poverty rate communities 
to assure that they can receive sufficient loan for production and consumption. The 
limitation of loan size set by Vietnam Bank for Social Policies need to match with 
the actual households’ demand because if the households cannot access to sufficient 
credit, loan efficiency would be reduced. Relaxing credit constraints is essential not 
only to enhance the household welfare but also narrow the welfare gap between the 
poor and non-poor households. The substitute effect of informal credit on the 
household welfare supports the idea about the integration of two credit sectors into 
one well-functioning market as documented in Phan, Gan, Nartea, and Cohen (2013) 
study. Since our study covers only small sample size, some implications are only 
applicable for NCC region.  
 6. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
One limitation arises from the usage of the Direct Elicitation method to identify credit 
constrained households. The method cannot detect effective and ineffective 
constraints. Another limitation is the inability of cross section data to capture long term 
impacts of credit constraints on household welfare. Finally, causes of credit constraints 
from the lender’s view cannot be observed. 
 
APPENDIX 
Table 2: Definition of variables and descriptive statistics 
Variables Description Mean S.D. 
CONSTRAINED 1 if household’s credit constrained, 0 = 
unconstrained 
0.40 0.49 
GENDER 1 if household head is male, 0 = female 0.79 0.40 
AGE_35 Household head is less than 35 0.09 0.29 
AGE_45 Household head’s age is between 35-45 0.34 0.48 
AGE_55 Household head’s age is  between 45-55 0.37 0.48 
AGE_55PLUS 1 if household head is older than 55; 0 = otherwise 0.19 0.39 
MARRIED 1 married households, 0 = otherwise 0.91 0.28 
PRI_EDU Primary school as highest level of education 0.08 0.28 
MID_EDU Middle school as highest level of education 0.68 0.47 
HIGH_EDU High school degree or higher 0.24 0.42 
OCCUPATION 1 if household’s main occupation is farm, 0 = 
otherwise 
0.60 0.49 
DEMANDDUM 1 if the amount of loan households needed to borrow 
is larger than  30 million VND, 0 = otherwise 
0.41 0.49 
LANDSIZE Size of household farm land (1000m2) 3.63 2.69 
INCOME Household’s annual income (Million VND) 58.64 30.19 
INRATIO Ratio of non-farm income to farm income 1.99 2.34 
EARNERS Number of income earners 2.33 0.82 
CON_PER Household’s consumption per capita (Million VND) 10.60 3.07 
LARATIO Ratio of labour to total family members 0.55 0.19 
OFFFARM Number of off-farm labours 1.27 0.83 
POOR 1 if household have poor certificate, 0 =  otherwise 0.20 0.40 
HH_SIZE Household size 4.41 1.31 
CHILD_NUM Number of children 3.02 1.15 
CHILDSTU 1 if household have child being tertiary student 0.28 0.45 
 INFORMAL 1 if household get sufficient credit from informal 
source 
0.22 0.41 
YENTHANH Geography dummy variable 0.25 0.43 
THACHHA Geography dummy variable 0.25 0.43 
HUONGTHUY Geography dummy variable 0.24 0.43 
Source: The author’s survey data 
Note: A total of 477 observations was used, 2 observations were excluded for the concern of 
outliers 
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